Fear, desire and the ideal of authenticity: antinomies of modernity in the works of Abe Kôbô and Martin Heidegger

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A formative experience of modernity has been the mixed experience of desire and fear. As the German historian Reinhart Koselleck has argued, modernity is characterized by a divergence of the “experience of the past” and the “expectations of the future” (Koselleck 1985:276). As the past loses its power to constrain the sense of future possibilities, the future increasingly comes to serve as a screen on which a plethora of desires, hopes and fears are projected.

A point of particular interest in this process is what happens to desire when the traditional patterns that guided its direction and provided the means for its satisfaction are destabilized. A pervasive sense of vulnerability is a striking feature in many modernist expressions of desire. We see it, for instance, in Baudelaire’s famous sonnet A une passante, which depicts the poet’s chance encounter with an anonymous passer-by on a street, a woman whose glance he happens to catch and who then disappears in the crowd, presumably for ever. As Walter Benjamin (1997) points out, the poem is not about love at first sight, but at last sight. “It is a farewell forever which coincides in the poem with the moment of enchantment. Thus the sonnet supplies the figure of shock, indeed of catastrophe” (idem:125).

Here we should note the ambiguous role of the crowd in the sonnet. This ambiguity can be described as an intermingling of fear and desire. The woman is borne along by the crowd to appear before the poet, but she is also snatched away by it, and it is the combination of these two moments that triggers the sensation of shock. The experience of shock, in other words, stems from a situation in which the promise of libidinal fulfillment clashes against the structures of modern society.
— from a situation balancing, so to speak, between the hope of fulfillment and the betrayal of this hope. This ambiguity is found in many depictions of the big city. On the one hand we have the sense of expectation and exhilaration, the enticing air of permissiveness and possibilities, and on the other hand there is the equally common experience of the city as a lonely, hostile desert of brute indifference. In the city, desire is not only “liberated” and barriers pulled down, but its fulfillment is also frustrated to a high degree, since it has to be pursued in a hostile world, always entailing the exposure of the subject to shocks and setbacks. This is why, as Benjamin points out, people in modernity tend to develop a heightened degree of consciousness or higher reflexivity, serving as a “protective shield” against the dangers of the environment.¹ Here we see why shock occupies such an important position in Benjamin’s analysis of modernity: it is a “crystal” in which the conflicting elements of modernity are reflected and visible in a condensed form – both vulnerability and suspicion, desire as well as fear. Modernity is a situation in which everything is still in the balance: it is both Utopia and wasteland in equal degree.

Nevertheless, the conflict between fear and desire is hardly an essential trait of modernity. In many contemporary societies, there are signs that this conflict is dying away. It dies away since people are developing structures of desire which no longer expose them to the shocks and the pain inherent in modern human relations. One of these structures is consumerism. Another is self-imposed solitude.² Most of these structures locate the object of desire outside social life, which is increasingly avoided as a source of gratification since it remains an arena of antagonism. We might call this process the redirection of desire from social to non-social objects. Along with this, desire gradually becomes disassociated from fear and loses part of its vulnerability. Objectively, non-social objects fulfill a social function. At the

¹ This echoes Georg Simmel’s classical observation that “intensification of nerve-life” in the modern metropolis brings about a dominance of the intellect over the emotions in spiritual life. This intellectualism, according to Simmel (1903 [1964]:410-414), helps protect them from the overabundance of stimuli in the environment, since intellectual detachment and blasé indifference take the place of deeper emotional involvement. The relation between shock and intellectualism is treated more fully in my dissertation (Cassegård 2002), on which this article is based.

² Jean Baudrillard is among those theorists who have been most explicit in diagnosing the realm of consumer objects as a non-social space. One of his chief claims in Consumer society (1970) is precisely that the effect of consumerism is to replace social relations with a “system of objects”. We make believe, he claims, that “purchasing and consumption must have the same value as any human relation” (Baudrillard 1988:14). Baudrillard emphasizes that one function of the “system of objects” is the neutralization of conflicts, since the “personalized” relations to commodities lack the conflictual character that becomes characteristic of libidinally charged human relations in modern societies and thus of shocks. For narcissism and privatization, see Freud’s theories of interiorization of libido in On narcissism (1914) and The Ego and the Id (1923) and their elaboration in Cassegård (2002). For the phenomenon of privatization in contemporary society, see also Miyadai & Fujii (2001), Lasch (1979), and Sennett (1986).
same time as they liberate desire from fear, they prevent it from posing a threat to
the social order. As numerous social thinkers – the Frankfurt school, Guy Debord
and Jean Baudrillard, to name just a few – have pointed out, they are “black holes”
which absorb the desire which might have led to social unrest. From the view-point
of the subject, on the other hand, as the non-social comes to shape people’s
orientations and actions, a spell of dreamlikeness is cast over society. As people
direct their desires to other things, society loses in reality.

The thesis which I will investigate here is that the situation in which the
subject was torn between fear and desire contributed vitally to the appeal of the
ideal of authenticity, which has been one of the most influential philosophical
models of the good life during the last two centuries. The philosopher Charles
Taylor, one of its proponents, traces the roots of this ideal back to romanticism and
especially to the thought of J. G. Herder. Its basic conviction, he writes, is the idea
that “each individual is different and original, and that this originality determines
how he or she ought to live”. Put simply, it is the ideal to be true to one self, to
one’s own unique “inner voice” and to one’s own unique way of being human
(Taylor 1989:374ff; 1994).³

The ideal of authenticity can be clarified by positioning it in relation to two
broader ideals, both of which form powerful currents in the modern philosophy of
the good life. These are the ideals of identity and inner nature, which can be
defined in the following way:

(1) Identity is an ideal of the good life which emphasizes self-preservation. The
ideal is to construct a more or less stable and unified personal identity,
capable of remaining essentially the “same” throughout the shifting situations
of life. In order to achieve identity the self needs to maintain its own unity and
continuity, and protect itself from alienating influences in its environment.
Crucial is the act of identification, i.e. the conscious act whereby one
subjectively recognizes what one is and what one wants to be. The ideal, in
other words, presupposes a strict dividing line between self and other.⁴

(2) The ideal of inner nature, on the other hand, is an ideal celebrating self-
transcendence, self-distancing or self-forgetting. It seeks the good in the

³ Taylor’s concept of authenticity builds on a classical analysis by Lionel Trilling (see
Trilling 1972:9-12, 93). For a perceptive analysis using Trilling’s concept of authenticity in
literary sociology, see Inoue (1985).

⁴ Contemporary proponents of this ideal include theorists such as Giddens (1991), Habermas
(1993), and Löw-Beer (1991). Due to his strong emphasis on “strong evaluations” as the core of
authenticity, Taylor himself is close to this idea. As we will see, Heidegger’s ideal of authenticici
y also tends towards the affirmation of identity.
dissolution of self that results from the pliancy and openness to the external world and to the impulses of an essentially amorphous inner nature. It demands freedom from conceptual limitations and rigid fixations, which tend to limit, imprison and impoverish the self.⁵

Although both the ideal of identity and that of nature have had their advocates, a more common philosophical strategy has been to attempt to combine them and reconcile their differences through more complex ideas. The ideal of authenticity is one such idea. In nuce, the basic idea is that the search for an authentic “inner voice” demands that one discards one’s conventional identity – consisting of the roles handed down by society and passively accepted by the individual – which is to be replaced by an authentic identity erected on the basis of one’s own unique individuality. Such an authentic identity is said to escape the insensitivity and rigidity of conventional identity and thus to satisfy the demands of inner nature. To illustrate how this is accomplished, we can turn to Ôe Kenzaburô’s novel The silent cry (Man’en gannen no futtobôru, 1967) in which a path to authenticity is opened up to the narrator, Mitsu, after his brother’s death. “I think the need to oppose Taka has always made you deliberately reject the things that resembled him in you. But Taka’s dead, Mitsu, so you should be fairer to yourself”, his wife tells him (Ôe 1981:270). Clinging to an illusory identity, Mitsu had denied his true self, which now again becomes accessible to him. Here Ôe repeats a common argument: spontaneity and openness are possible only to those who are in possession of a secure identity, accepting who they “truly” are instead of denying it, to those – in other words – who have achieved an “authentic” identity. An authentic self is supposedly able to combine pliancy to amorphous nature with the reassurance that it always “remains itself”. Even as it gives free rein to spontaneous impulses, its integrity remains intact.

The apparent success of the ideal of authenticity to reconcile identity with nature may explain part of its popularity. However, as I will attempt to demonstrate in the writings of Abe Kôbô and Martin Heidegger, the attempt at reconciliation is ultimately paradoxical. I will start by having a look at the close connection between ideal of authenticity and the conflict between fear and desire, first in some novels by Abe Kôbô, mainly The woman of the dunes (Suna no onna) from 1962, and then in Martin Heidegger’s Being and time (Sein und Zeit), which was published in 1927. Both these periods – the 60’s in Japan and the 20’s in Germany – were times of social and political unrest. It is hardly an exaggeration to

⁵ Varieties of this model of the good life are found in the writings of Nishida (1990), Adorno (1996) and the writer Musil (1981). Although less outspoken, I believe that writers such as Kawabata Yasunari and perhaps Murakami Haruki are also close to this model (cfr Cassegård 2002).
say that social life itself was an object of passionate desires and struggles, and that
the feeling of crisis and of fear was intense and predominant. In the paradoxical
structure of the ideal of authenticity in Abe as well as in Heidegger we see the
traces of the dilemmas of their age. As it resurfaces the unreconciled state of this
conflict reveals itself as a tension in the very concept of authenticity. While fear
contributes to the strengthening of identity – to the construction of ever stronger
”protective shields” – desire gives rise to a yearning to return to nature.

Finally, I will address the implications of the shift towards non-sociality for
the ideal of authenticity. While authenticity is commonly regarded as an attempt to
set the self off from society, I will here read it as an attempt to live in society,
harmonizing fear and desire, while maintaining one’s personal integrity as a unique
being intact. Unlike the one whose desire is primarily oriented towards non-social
objects and for whom the relation to others is a matter of indifference, to those who
aspire to authenticity, the relations to others cannot be a matter of indifference
since they have to be authentic. If, however, the ideal of authenticity is
fundamentally predicated on an affirmation of social life, will it not be crucially
undermined by the shift towards non-social areas of gratification? Will not the
conflict from which the ideal of authenticity draws its strength be weakened as
society recedes into dreamlikeness?

1. Abe Kôbô and the ideal of authenticity

The narrative of Abe Kôbô’s short novel Just like a human (Ningen sokkuri, 1967)
consists of a letter that the protagonist writes to his wife. It is a desperate call for
help in which he makes it clear that she is his last hope, but it also bears the marks
of conscious distortion since he suspects that she might be in collusion with his
enemies. His predicament brings into focus a fear of intimacy that runs through
most of Abe’s oeuvre and which manifests itself even on the level of style. His
preferred mode of narration is a crystal-clear scientific prose that serves to create a
distance between the reader and the narrator. In contrast to the intimate,
confidential style of conventional novels, it arouses caution. The narrator does not
trust his reader, who in turn feels unable to trust the narrator. But this style is
sometimes interrupted by uninhibited and moving passages in which the narrator
lets his despair shine through. One cannot help thinking that this oscillation
between distrustful objectivity and naked cries for help reflects Abe’s basic
attitude to modernity, an attitude in which others are simultaneously seen through
the two lenses of fear and desire. Just as in Benjamin, modernity is essentially a
hostile world, experienced through a mixture of fear and desire, in which the
subject constantly needs to be on its guard against shock.
1.1 The defeat of the intellect

Far from serving as an effective “protective shield”, however, the efforts of the intellect are ultimately powerless against the madness which threatens to engulf it. Although his protagonists maintain a state of constant and unrelieved intellectual alert, their intellectual efforts are singularly incapable of helping them. To the private investigator of *The ruined map* (*Moetsukita chizu*, 1967) the numberless hypotheses which he constructs, are like a “like a broken compass”, pointing “now in one direction, now in another” (Abe 1993:103).

The powerlessness of the intellect is underscored by that of “information”, a category which plays a central role in the writings of Abe. For instance, the narrator of *The boxman* (*Hako otoko*, 1973) claims that he cannot “stand being without fresh news reports for a second” and therefore possesses “seven different dailies” and “two TV’s and three radios” in his room (Abe 1982:92). Information is supposedly what the intellect needs to know in order to function. Yet the boxman’s attempt to keep up with it is so exaggerated that there is no time left over for his own life. Furthermore, hardly any piece of information which Abe’s protagonists manage to gather is of the slightest use. Thus the private eye in *The ruined map* is an expert in memorizing irrelevant details. Routine observations like “a very ordinary coffee house; capacity about eighteen seats” or “to the right was a small bench”, delivered in a laconic matter-of-fact manner, acquire a comical character because of their total irrelevance.

As one would expect from the account of the uselessness of information, the protagonists who rely on it are headed for disaster. One of the most instructive — and humoristic — accounts of the shortcomings of information is found in *Secret rendezvous* (*Mikkai*, 1977). As its protagonist goes to the hospital in quest of his kidnapped wife, he finds himself completely lost in a system so complex and so bizarre – its function seems to consist mainly in obscure sexual experiments – that his own intellectual efforts fail to help him the slightest. He discovers that “hundreds, perhaps thousands of microphones” are hidden throughout the hospital, recording his and everyone else’s words and movements. When he is finally let into the playback room and attempts to hear his wife’s voice on the tapes, he realizes that it is of no help at all since the number of conversations and the mass of information he needs to master is simply too great. Here we see that cause of the defeat of the self and of the intellect. It is not that the intellectual understanding as such is inferior (to intuition), it is only by absurdly being pitted against the superior and superhuman capacity of the system itself that it is bound to be defeated. The final image of this novel — in which the protagonist faces death of starvation and fatigue locked up in the vast underground labyrinth of the hospital — is one of
such unrelieved horror, that it stands as one of the most vivid depictions of the triumph of madness to be found in the output of Abe. The fundamental movement of the novel is thus not the pacification of shock but its escalation and final victory.

In other novels too, we find the theme of the defeat of the intellect at the hands of the superior might of the system. Thus the private detective of *The ruined map* is ultimately powerless against the immense and mysterious “bounded infinity” of the city, in which he slowly but irresistibly loses his grip of his own memories and his own identity, identifying with the man he is searching for. A similar tendency is at work in *The woman of the dunes*. Here the role of the city is taken over by the rural dystopia of the sand village and by the mysterious sandwoman. Although the entrapped protagonist desperately constructs one escape plan after the other, he feels how the sand undermines his identity. In the end, he willingly accepts life in the sand village. Even more striking is the defeat depicted in *Dendrocacalia* (*Dendorokakaria*, 1949), where the impulse of the protagonist to turn himself into a plant finally turns out to be irresistible, despite his desperate efforts to suppress it.

1.2 The temptation of regression

It is not always the case that the defeat is experienced in a purely negative and destructive fashion. What lends *Dendrocacalia* its psychological credibility is the way it evokes the “death instinct”, the desire to “return to the quiescence of the inorganic world” or to sink back into an “inanimate state”, which is how Freud (1991:336) defines it. According to Freud, the threats to the “protective shield” of consciousness, or to the integrity of the subject, has a source inside the unconscious itself. This is what makes regression a temptation, rather than something that is induced only from the outside.

In Abe (1993), this instinct triumphs so easily because the ground is well prepared. When the detective’s ex-wife in *The ruined map* points out to him that he too has run away, and not only the man he is hunting, he asks her from what — from her?

‘Certainly not from me’, she said, shaking her head vigorously. ‘From life, from the endless competing and dickering, the tightrope walking, the scramble for a life buoy. It’s true, isn’t it? In the final analysis, I was merely an excuse.’ (Abe 1993:172).

It is the longing to escape from the losing battle against the superior might of shock which lends the death-instinct power. Again, it is in the discrepancy of strength between the individual and the superhuman force of the system that we
catch a glimpse to the social background to the increased susceptibility to intellectual regression. In late capitalism, Theodor Adorno claims, individuals must identify with the system in order to survive. The one who fails to adopt becomes an outsider who brings on himself the wrath of the collective. But the nervous adaptability to power is mixed with a restless longing – “doing things and going places” – to escape it (Adorno 1978:139). At one point in The ruined map, the detective drives his car out to a freeway for no reason at all, secretly hoping for the journey to go on forever. “When you are driving”, he explains, “you never want to think of stopping... But when it’s over, you shudder at a state like that, with no end” (Abe 1993:190).

Modernity then is not only shock and the rule of the intellect, but also fatigue. It is the denial of rest; it is that which is too big, too complex. Hence the temptation to retreat into a sheltered, smaller, simpler world. “The mental attitude of someone playing pinball”, the detective of The ruined map muses outside a pinball arcade, “is the same as that of a person who disappears” (Abe 1993:225). Abe (1982:165) once wrote that when he saw big things he wanted to die. This yearning to retreat is immensely perverse, because it is accompanied by the awareness that it is forbidden. It is what Slavoj Zizek (1994) calls an obscene enjoyment or jouissance, the pleasure of self-destruction. It arises in a modernity that is so tensely suspended between the extremes of shock and a heightened consciousness that the mind wears itself out. It yearns for a forbidden rest, a rest that is denied it in the societies of modernity.

Unlike the nightmarish hospital of Secret rendezvous, the city in which the detective finally loses himself in The ruined map has the quiet sweetness of a refuge. The city, to be sure, is the agent which dissolves his identity. As in Dendrocacalia, the protagonist is finally “transformed”, but not through shock – rather through a process which in tenderness is comparable to that of falling asleep. The ruined map foreshadows the “naturalization” of the city, a process whereby the city takes on the gentle and enchanted guise of archaic nature. Here the city is both a hostile and a friendly entity, in which the individual is both absorbed and salvaged. The story, in fact, ends with a smile: the amnesiac protagonist sets out to find a new world which he himself has chosen.

Modernity itself, then, is the ferment of the increased pull of the temptation of regression, a temptation in which the twin elements of dread and enjoyment are mixed. For Abe, just as for Freud and Adorno, the defeat of the intellect is not only dreaded, but also something the subject itself might desire. As we shall see, this ambivalence is mirrored in the attitude to modernity and to women in Abe’s fiction.
1.3 The portrayal of women

Abe’s female characters are typically depicted with intense fear and simultaneously with intense desire. This way of portraying women contrasts strikingly with the portrayals we find, for instance, in the works of Kawabata Yasunari or Murakami Haruki. With the former, the presence of the hostile world of modernity is covered behind a veil of elegy. Women like Komako in *Snow country* (*Yukiguni*, 1935-37) or Fumiko in *Thousand cranes* (*Senbazuru*, 1949-51) are hardly ever felt to be enemies. If anything, they are characterized by defenselessness – a trait which undoubtedly contributes to the cruelty of the male heroes, who seem to find a particular kind of masochistically tinged pleasure in the fact that they will continue to be loved no matter how much pain men inflict on their female victims. For these male heroes, woman is not yet part of the hostile world of enemies. Women in the contemporary fiction of Murakami Haruki are usually also portrayed as friendly and gentle. Here, however, the cause seems to be quite different from that in the works of Kawabata. It seems to lie in the self-imposed solitude and narcissism of the male heroes, who – secure in their stoically maintained inward kingdoms – have made themselves almost invulnerable to external shocks. Neither Kawabata nor Murakami, although for different reasons, usually depict women as sources of shock or pain.

Not so with Abe. Consider for example *The boxman*. The cardboard box which covers the narrator can easily be interpreted as a material metaphor for the “protective shield” of the intellect, a shell which isolates at the same time as it protects. His libido is still directed outwards, however, to a woman whom he at the same time distrusts as a potential enemy. His predicament reflects Abe’s keen sense of the vulnerability of desire in modernity. As Napier (1996:75) observes about the fiction of Abe, “encounters between male and female are always disastrous”. To live in a modern world is to live in a world of enemies. In such a world, it is impossible to love without pain. To survive in this hell, the protagonists have to don the armor of the intellect. But thanks to this intellectualization, their desire is transformed and objectified. This results in the chilly character of sexuality which is so strikingly evident, for example in the bizarre sexual experiments in the hospital in *Secret rendezvous*. The problematization of how desire is deformed through hostility and fear is even more explicit in *The face of another* (*Tanin no kao*, 1964), in which the protagonist, reflecting on a sexual episode with an unknown woman in a crowded train, claims that the intellect necessarily transforms eroticism into an “impersonal” relation between two
“enemies” (Abe 1967:146f). The conflict then, is one between fear and desire, a conflict which can also be interpreted as a conflict between personal identity and inner nature. While identity is necessary in world of enemies, love would require the trust and vulnerability of nature.

Let us turn to the enigmatic women portrayed in *The woman of the dunes* and *The ruined map*, both of whom are living metaphors of the social machinery – the sand village or the big city – which finally crushes the heroes. In the latter novel, the narrator is a private eye who is hired by the woman to find her missing husband. After taking leave of her he stands below her apartment, at the spot where her husband had last been seen, gazing up at the lemon-yellow curtains (Abe 1993:31). As the critic Maeda Ai (1989:330ff) remarks, the room with is endowed with a sexual aura. Although Abe’s novels are often set in what Maeda calls transparent “landscapes” ruled by reason, these landscapes typically coexist with tactile “erotic spaces” that are permeated by desire. The sandwoman’s dwelling in *The woman of the dunes*, which provides an erotic space for the protagonist in the midst of the barren sand landscape, is another example. In *The face of another*, the masked scientist’s obsession with returning home in order to seduce his wife endows her with an erotic aura of unattainability. The function of these women, Maeda (1989:330ff) remarks, is that of a sacred miko or shaman who in her room exorcises the evil of alienation.

However, Abe’s protagonists are usually barred from entering these rooms by their own fear and suspiciousness. By the time Abe began to write *The ruined map*, Maeda (Maeda 1989:332) writes, “he had sharply realized that escaping to the erotic space was nothing but losing oneself in a ‘false community’.” The novel ends on a note of desolation as the amnesiac protagonist sets out to start a new life by himself. In *The face of another* the hero’s inability to put aside his “protective shield” – symbolized by a lifelike mask that covers his scarred face and which he uses to conceal his identity – brings about the breakup of the relationship between him and his wife.

The one possible exception to this pattern seems to be *The woman of the dunes*, which seemingly ends “happily” with the protagonist’s “authentic” decision to stay with the sandwoman. Let us have a closer look at this apparent solution.

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6 To be sure, the reader is never explicitly told about the protagonist’s decision. It is, however, strongly suggested that he has decided to stay on in the village, both by his desire to tell the villagers of his invention of a machine for extracting water from the sand and by the death-certificate issued in his absence by the authorities. For an interpretation emphasizing the “sunny” aspects of the ending as the end of a learning-process whereby Niki learns shed his conventional identity and to affirm himself and his Eros, see Kimball (1973:115-39). For an interpretation stressing the problematic aspects of his decision to stay in the village, see Yamanouchi (1980:156f).
1.4 The antinomies of authenticity

It is sometimes asserted that Abe opposes the modern rule of the intellect with a model of the good life based on the notion of “authenticity”. The novel in which this assertion seems to have the greatest measure of truth is *The woman of the dunes*. This relatively early novel also seems to break the pattern that relations between men and women in Abe’s fiction must always end disastrously. Instead it ends on an unusually sunny note, even offering itself up as an account of possible redemption. The fundamental movement of the narrative is that of the awakening of life, the recovery from the nightmare. In its optimism that authentic life is still possible, this novel lacks the dark negativism of Abe’s later works. For the entrapped protagonist Niki Junpei, who is caught in the sand-village and forced to share a house with a woman, the desire which leads to regression has less to do with the death-instinct than with Eros. His imprisonment in the sand village is accompanied by the arousal of libido.

Initially, however, Niki Junpei clings to his conventional (and illusory) identity as a schoolteacher and husband, and sees nothing but dangers in the woman’s approaches. There is a scene is which he is seized by fear at a particular “crouching position” of hers, exactly because he is aroused by it. Might she not be part of some criminal conspiracy to trap him?

He couldn’t relax his guard. Her charms were like some meat-eating plant, purposely equipped with the smell of sweet honey. First she would sow the seeds of scandal by bringing him to an act of passion, and then the chains of blackmail would bind him hand and foot (Abe 1981b:87)

Here again we encounter the central theme of the conflict between fear and desire. In this rule of the protective shield, with its concomitant distortion of desire through fear, we have the state of inauthenticity. With time, however, and after numerous futile attempts to escape, Niki Junpei’s resistance breaks down and he learns to affirm his desire for the woman. As Kimball (1973:123) points out, the protagonist’s encounter with sand is portrayed as a learning process. It is a process whereby his conventional identity is broken down and with it his acute time-consciousness and his reliance on the intellect. In the end he seems to opt for a new life with her, staying on voluntarily in the sand village despite being offered the opportunity to escape. Does this mean that Abe at least in this novel believes in the possibility of escaping the nightmare of modernity, with its hellish mixture of fear

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and desire, into an “erotic space”? Does the “authentic” decision break the evil spell and open up a space in which love without shock is possible?

We have described “authenticity” as an attempt to reconcile the ideals of personal identity and inner nature. It is also an attempt to overcome the conflict between fear and desire. Niki Junpei’s “authenticity” would consist in his ability, through a "free choice", to affirm his desire for the feared sandwoman without having to sacrifice his self-integrity. The question remains, however, if this free choice implies any resolution of the conflict between fear and desire. What fascinates in Abe’s portrait of the sandwoman is hardly that she offers a refuge from the conflict. Is it not rather that she retains her ambiguity throughout – that she, so to speak, essentially inspires fear as well as desire? While offering the protagonist a return to long-lost nature, she is also an enemy threatening his identity, an agent of the system that entraps him. So is the woman in the room with the yellow curtains in The ruined map. Both women appear in a kind of double-exposure: being avatars of a superhumanly powerful social system – the sand village or the big city – while simultaneously offering rest from this system by enticing the protagonists into the “erotic space” of their rooms. If one is to seek an explanation for the ambiguous feelings which seize the reader at the end of The woman of the dunes – a mixture of relief and suffocation – then this is it. Niki Junpei’s “authentic” choice does not resolve, but simply reproduces the tension that is to be found also in the concepts of authenticity in Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre, where freedom is affirmed as “fate”, as a “burden”. The “authentic” shouldering of one’s responsibilities, portrayed as a release of one’s innermost energies, is also a submission to the forces that be. The subject’s freedom, in other words, tends to be equated with the victory of the forces that crushes it.

The woman of the dunes, then, cannot be read as a straightforward story of the triumph of the subject. It would be an even worse mistake to read it as an unqualified rejection of modern intellectualism and a celebration of the return to nature. The character of the sandwoman – and of the sand community to which she belongs – exert their fascination because of their ambivalence. Suffice it here to state, that the sand village is also a rural dystopia, cruel and totalitarian, and that Abe in fact portrays the protagonist’s decision to stay on as highly ambivalent.

To be sure, The woman of the dunes does end on a relatively hopeful note. It seems likely, however, that the “nihilism” (Napier 1996:198-206) of Abe’s later

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8 For a criticism of authenticity as conflating freedom and surrender and thus weakening the critical impulse, see Adorno (1978:154, 1996:67). The dual affirmation of freedom from identity and the necessity of identity is the theme of several of Abe’s works, most obviously maybe in The crime of S. Karma (S. Karuma shi no hanzai, 1951), in which the protagonist’s visiting card takes on a life of its own, usurping the name and, with it, the life of the protagonist. The protagonist, however, insists on the hopeless task of finding his true name. In his battle against the “copy” he has to assert his authenticity (Abe 1997).
works reflects a growing disillusionment with the ideal of authenticity. This process can be traced in his portrayals of women. To be sure, enigmatic females similar to the sandwoman continue to appear in his work, such as the woman with the yellow curtains in *The ruined map*. Badly beaten, the hero seeks help at the woman’s apartment. While she nurses him, he thinks: “For whom does it beat… this enormous heart of the city that goes on pulsating, not knowing for whom?” (Abe 1993:270). To his feverish eye the woman and the city become identical. Here, however, the perversity of the “double-exposure” through which the image of the city is superimposed on that of the woman is glaringly conspicuous. The city is humanized, but through the same operation the woman is made to appear uncanny, a mere figura of the inhumanity of the city. As Maeda (1989:330ff) points out, by the time of this novel Abe had realized that the “erotic space” provided by the woman in her room could only offer a “false community”. To stay with her would reproduce the tension between fear and desire rather than overcoming it. Near the end, the amnesiac protagonist escapes. *The ruined map* ends in radical loneliness, in contrast to the submission to the community of the sand village in *The woman of the dunes*.

The portrayal of women in Abe’s later works also reflects the tendency for the ideal of authenticity to fall apart in the two models of personal identity and inner nature. In these works, the sandwoman, so to speak, tends to be replaced by two less complex kinds of females. On the one hand, there is the malevolent, hostile female, whose sole intention is to harm the protagonist. In this group we find, for example, the sexy secretary in *Secret rendezvous*, who — born from a testtube — lacks all human emotions, and who becomes a kind of emblematic figure of the artificiality and reified character of modern life. On the other hand, there are female characters who appear to be symbols of nature and utopian counterimages to modernity. Here we find the thirteen year old nymphomaniac in the same novel whose bones are gradually liquefying — the single character in *Secret rendezvous* who approaches the protagonist with complete and naive trust. The triumph of the secretary and the cruel fate of the girl at the end of *Secret rendezvous* fit in well with the reading of it as a story of the triumph of shock.

The development of Abe’s portrayal of women thus demonstrates the fragility of the ideal of authenticity. Unable to reconcile the opposed currents of fear and desire, it tends to disintegrate and take its center around either of the two. This tendency can also be seen if we compare Abe with Heidegger. In Heidegger, there is a tendency to put priority on the need for self-preservation, even at the cost of suppressing desire. Abe, by contrast, tends towards an affirmation of desire even in the face of having to accept shock and final defeat. This tendency becomes even stronger in later novels, in which authenticity finally becomes little more than the subject’s full recognition of the catastrophe that is about to befall him. Thus the
horror of the last pages of *Secret rendezvous*, in which Abe’s final version of authenticity is captured. Since the ideal puts greater emphasis on affirmation of desire than on self-preservation, it tends to collapse into the ideal of inner nature. But this nature is powerless to resist the predominance of shock and the forces of atomization in modern society. Desire offers no way of mitigating the shock to which it exposes itself. After the failure of authenticity to redeem its promises, nothing remains but the unbridgeable opposition between two sexes, driven towards each other by desire but ending up hurting each other with shocks.

2. **Martin Heidegger and the ideal of authenticity**

Can the ambiguity we detected in Abe’s fiction also be found in what is probably the most influential philosophical articulation of the ideal of authenticity, Martin Heidegger’s *Being and time*? To begin with, we can note a striking ambiguity in the very definition or delimitation of this concept. *Dasein* (or the self) is authentic when it “chooses itself”, when it is “its own”, or in other words when it remains itself and keeps out whatever is alien (Heidegger 1967:42). Stated in general terms, authenticity is a condition in which one turns to oneself to determine how one wants to live, and in which one does not let oneself be more influenced by one’s environment than by oneself. Conversely, inauthenticity is not being oneself, to live the life of a stranger. By orienting oneself towards one’s environment and doing what “everyone” (*das Man*) does – indulging in “curiosity”, “gossip”, “clamor” and “non-commitment” – one ends up living the life of a stranger and neglecting one’s own possibilities. As in all models of identity, a clear demarcation line is thus drawn between what is “one’s own” and what is “alien”. Rather then to adapt – horizontally, as it were – to others, one strives to establish a – temporal – continuity in one’s life. Yet even so, *Dasein* is supposed to remain “open to the situation” and capable of “grasping the moment”. Thus the self is to be protected at all cost, yet at the same time open to change. We thus see a clear attempt to combine the demands of self-preservation and inner nature through the mediating function of the concept of authenticity. As we will see, the ability of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity to reconcile these demands crucially hinges on the meaning of temporal continuity. For this reason, Heidegger’s most pregnant definition of authenticity is delivered in connection with his discussion of the temporality of *Dasein*.

2.1 **The “unity of ekstases”**

Exactly what does Heidegger mean by authenticity? It is a certain attitude towards temporality. He proceeds to show this by means of an analysis of the basic structure of *Dasein*. This structure — which he calls care (*Sorge*) — has three
elements, which he links to corresponding elements or “ek-stases” of temporality: the future, the present and the past. In this way temporality becomes constitutive of *Dasein* itself. *Dasein* is always simultaneously “projecting” into the future, “being thrown” by the past, and engaged in the present. Authenticity can thus be described in terms of how *Dasein* relates to these three “ek-stases”. Authentic *Dasein* assumes responsibility for the future, is true to its roots in the past, and resolutely grasps the possibilities of the present. Inauthentic *Dasein*, on the other hand, passively waits for the future, forgets its past, and becomes blind to the possibilities of the present (Heidegger 1967:325ff). Inauthentic *Dasein* thus breaks up the interconnectedness of the three ek-stases and fails to locate itself in relation to them. In authenticity, on the other hand, the three ek-stases are brought together into a congruent whole. Authenticity is the unity of *Dasein*’s recollection of its inherited possibilities, of the future that it projects and the decision that it makes here and now. The unity of this threefold movement is central. “[O]nly a being that, in anticipating, just as primordially is having-been, is able to convey to itself the inherited possibility, to grasp its own being-thrown and to be instantaneous for ‘its time’.” (idem:385).

Here it seems clear that Heidegger is adhering to a model of identity. It is true that the “innermost possibility” of *Dasein* is no given essence waiting to be discovered within the self. However, his vision of the good life is built around the notion of continuity in life. Change and novelty are only acceptable if one is certain that the change is in accordance with the past. Past, future and present must be congruent, which means that *Dasein* must at every moment be able to recognize itself in every other moment of its life — whether past, present or future.

But what is the role of the present in this unity? As we see, it is in the present that *Dasein* is supposed to “be instantaneous” to its moment. Might this provide the sought-after outlet of the impulses of inner nature?

### 2.2 The “openness of being”

*Dasein* rediscovers itself by clearing itself away from all determinations, in the openness of the present or in what Heidegger would later, in *Was is Metaphysik* (1929), call “nothingness” (*das Nichts*). This state of openness of being is illustrated through the concept of “anxiety” (*Angst*). In its anxiety *Dasein* hears the call of conscience. “Resolve” is to understand and listen to this call. But what ought *Dasein* resolve to do? Since this depends on the “situation”, the content of the call of conscience is always indeterminate. Since, in a state of inauthenticity, one is fascinated by “clamor”, conscience has to call “without clamor”. Here his philosophy reveals itself as what Habermas (1994:141) calls a “decisionism of empty resoluteness”. But what I primarily want to direct attention to is that
Heidegger with this move – to see the task of conscience in calling *Dasein* into the indeterminacy of the situation – provides a description of the state of authenticity that is surprisingly close to the ideal of inner nature – a state in which *Dasein* keeps “free and open” to the prevailing possibility (Heidegger 1967:307f). Heidegger goes even further. What is revealed in the openness of the present is that being is itself fundamentally open and groundless. The indeterminacy of being (*Offenheit des Seienden*) results from the fact that it is founded on “nothingness” (Heidegger 1996:114). This means that Heidegger equates “being oneself” (*Selbstsein*), or authenticity, with openness and freedom. Opening itself to the situation means that *Dasein* never commits itself for ever, but continually has to “retract” itself and its decisions. *Dasein*, in other words, can only realize its innermost possibility by making itself fundamentally indeterminate. “Only in the nothingness of its *Dasein* does the existent wholly comply with its innermost possibility” (idem:120). What we can here observe is that Heidegger through his emphasis on the indeterminacy of being comes close to satisfying the ideal of inner nature. We will now see, however, that this is a mere mirage.

### 2.3 The relation between the “unity of ekstases” and the “openness of being”

It might look as if the idea of the “openness of being” runs counter to the insistence on the “unity of ekstases”, but this is not so. Far from being incompatible with the maintenance of continuity, the openness of *Dasein* is designed as its very presupposition. *Dasein* is authentic if it takes its orientation not from others – horizontally – but from its own past and future – vertically. It must open itself to the *Stimmungen* of the present, which – in the stillness when the “clamor” of others has died away — will spring from the innermost recesses of its past and tell it what future to project. The Heideggerian openness is thus a means for forging and supporting the unity of ekstases. This openness is achieved by shutting out others. Nothingness is the state in which *Dasein* opens itself up, not to everything, but to its own innermost possibility. To repeat: “Only in the nothingness of its *Dasein* does the existent wholly comply with its innermost possibility”. The freedom of authentic *Dasein* is therefore linked to the apprehension of inevitability, and must not be confused with an abstract freedom of choice. The more authentic *Dasein* is, he writes, the less gratuitous is its choice. Heidegger uses the word “fate” to describe this inevitability. *Dasein* is “torn away from the multitude of the close-by possibilities” and brought into “the simplicity of its fate” (Heidegger 1967:384). Thus freedom turns into necessity. Freedom becomes affirmation of one’s limitations. The openness of the present is abruptly turned into the submission to fate. As we see, tendentially, also in the works of Abe, freedom is conflated with
unfreedom: freedom becomes the affirmation of a limitation.

This means that Heidegger’s concept of “possibility“ must be treated with caution. If “possibility” is taken in a broad sense to mean everything one has the power and will to realize, then Heidegger would take the step over to the ideal of inner nature and Dasein would be authentic whatever possibility it chooses to realize. The refusal to take this step, which would have required a renunciation of the idea of authenticity as a unity of ekstases, forces Heidegger to differentiate, rather awkwardly, between possibilities that bring Dasein closer to itself and those that make it alien to itself. Furthermore, and in blatant contrast to the thesis of indeterminacy, the content of the desirable possibilities is even given a far-reaching measure of concretization. Not only does Heidegger, abstractly, demand that indeterminacy deliver itself up to determinacy. The content of determination is even prescribed in advance by his disdainful tirades against such inauthentic modes as “self-importance”, “curiosity”, “love of pleasure” and so on. Here the call of conscience joins in with the “clamor”. That this fits badly with his philosophy of nothingness goes without saying.

The fact that the unity of ekstases assumes priority over the affirmation of indeterminacy as such is telling. It means that it is finally the ideal of identity which triumphs in Heidegger. While Abe’s version of authenticity tended towards an affirmation of desire even in the face of having to accept shock and final defeat, in Heidegger, by contrast, we see the opposed tendency to put priority on the need for self-preservation, even at the cost of suppressing desire. Desire, far from being reconciled with self-preservation, is swept under the carpet as if it could be included unproblematically in the concept of authenticity. This means that his version of authenticity is vulnerable to the critique of identity that it takes on itself the brutality of modern society and has to oppress inner nature. This is exactly the criticism directed against Heidegger’s ideal of authenticity by Adorno.

The equation of the genuine and the true is untenable. It is precisely undeviating self-reflection – the practice of which Nietzsche called psychology, that is, insistence on the truth about oneself, that shows again and again, even in the first conscious experiences of childhood, that the impulses reflected upon are not quite ‘genuine’. They always contain an element of imitation, play, wanting to be different. The desire, through submergence in one’s own individuality, instead of social insight into it, to touch something utterly solid, ultimate being, leads to precisely the false identity which since Kierkegaard the concept of authenticity has been supposed to exorcise.

(Adorno 1978:153)

Adorno’s criticism erases the dividing line between “one’s own” and “the alien”.

The richness of the subject becomes dependent on the richness of the world that it experiences. One of his central theses is that it cannot isolate itself from this world without impoverishing itself. There is nothing “genuine” or authentic, nothing solid or fixed, that constitutes the self. The impulses of the self always comprise a wish to be non-identical, “imitation, play, wanting to be different”. The ideal of authenticity would stifle these impulses. “Anything that does not wish to wither”, Adorno (idem:154) writes, “should rather take on itself the stigma of the inauthentic”. With these words, Adorno not only affiliates himself with the ideal of inner nature. His criticism also shows that Heidegger does not manage to satisfy this ideal. In his view authenticity itself merely reproduces the oppression of inner nature which it accuses conventional identity of perpetrating.

3. Recapitulation

We have seen how the ideal of authenticity in Abe and Heidegger is destablized by an inner tension. Despite efforts to combine the ideals of nature and identity, Abe drifts towards the former and Heidegger towards the latter.

In my interpretation, the ambiguity of the ideal of authenticity derives from the state of a subject which is torn between fear and desire. The simultaneous pressure from these two forces is a characteristic of the historical juncture at which this ideal originates. The ideal of authenticity is an attempt to reconcile these two opposed currents. Whichever version of this ideal one looks to one finds a straining to affirm both at once. This is true not only of Abe and Heidegger, but also of Jean-Paul Sartre, Charles Taylor, Alessandro Ferrara and other theorists of authenticity. Identity is criticized, but only in order to be replaced by an “authentic” identity, defined as the awareness of freedom. Inner nature is valorized, but only as the freedom to search for identity.

But if this interpretation – that a paradox in the idea mirrors the social contradiction from which it originated – is accepted, then a further question offers itself. What is the fate of the ideal of authenticity if the social structures which produce and regulate fear and desire become separated from each other on such a large scale that they no longer enter into conflict with each other? What happens if desire is redirected to a non-social space where there is no shock and no need to build up the protective shields of identity?

4. Non-social desire and authenticity

Compared to the heroic days of Abe and Heidegger, modernity has grown older. As society recedes into the semblance of unchangeable nature, fear and the need

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for self-preservation subsides and desire settles in stable trajectories. Emblematic of this age, the cultural anthropologist Aoki Tamotsu writes, is the “pleasant sentimentalism” of the world of Murakami Haruki’s fiction.

The Murakami hero is content with the isolation that is so much a part of contemporary life [...] He lives in a world in which it is not only possible, but desirable, to avoid interference with others, and this is precisely the character of Japanese society during the twenty years of rapid growth. (Aoki 1996:272)

The mood of the prototypical Murakami hero, he also writes, “suggests an intense indifference; neither happy nor sad, replete nor empty, lonely nor loved, he simply exists. This is life in the 1980’s” (Aoki 1996:271).

What we can observe about this mood is that it neither resembles authenticity nor inauthenticity. The protagonist is typically one who has suspended all efforts to make up his mind about his life, which remains undefined and unsettled. There is no will either to establish continuities nor to establish any identity vis-à-vis others. But neither does the label “inauthentic” seem appropriate. The cool of the Murakami hero is lightyears removed from the desperate intellectualizations characteristic of conventional identity in Abe. The nervous accommodation to others and the indulgence in “curiosity”, “gossip” and “clamor”, through which Heidegger defines his prototype of inauthenticity, das Man, are simply just as antithetical to the mode of the Murakami hero as to the concept of authenticity itself.

What we see in the works of Murakami is the disappearance of society as an object of desire. Such a disappearance can take many forms. One is the stoic interiorization of libido, which we see in Murakami. Another is the redirection of desire to material things. In all these cases we encounter a mood similar to the “pleasant sentimentalism” mentioned by Aoki. Since it is a mood characterized by the absence of the contradiction between fear and desire which fueled the rise of the ideal of authenticity, it is also a mood in which this ideal has difficulties to strike root.

To be sure, the ideal of authenticity still lives on. It is vigorously present in Paul Auster. It forms a powerful undercurrent in DeLillo’s Underworld (1997). It returns to the fore in Murakami’s novel The wind-up bird chronicle. However, it can no longer draw strength automatically from people’s wish to resolve the contradiction between fear and desire. Instead, it becomes an ideal which presupposes a choice. The choice to search for a good life in society, to locate objects of desire in the relations to others. When the ideal of authenticity does reappear — as in The wind-up bird chronicle or Wim Wenders’ 1987 film Wings of desire — it typically depicts heroes who begin their quest for fate, continuity
and belonging not by turning their backs to inauthentic engrossment in society, but by turning their backs to the pleasant loneliness of non-social disengagement. As the non-social areas of life grow larger, the central contradiction ceases to be one between fear and desire. This conflict is only encountered if one chooses to remain within society. This means that the price for escaping it is solitude. It is on the basis of this dilemma that a new contradiction takes form. The central problem now, one might surmise, is whether one feels like affirming society or not. All contemporary culture, including the discussions about the good life, is affected by this problem.

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